Obama’s Kashmir thesis
Impact on Indo-Pak peace process
By
M.M.Khajooria
The President elect of USA , Barack Obama has reiterated his resolve to redeploy American troops from Iraq to Afghanistan. “well, I have said during the campaign, and I have stuck to this commitment that as soon as I take office, I will call in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, my national security apparatus, and we will start executing a plan that draws down troops.” he told CBS 60 minutes In his maiden wide ranging interview after his historic win. Obama found this switch over necessary “Particularly in the light of the problems we are having in Afghanistan, which has continued to worsen , we have to shore up those efforts” he argued. Any focus on Afghanistan necessarily involved Pakistan to whose army the USA has” out soured “ the fight against the AL Queda. Most of the difficulties in Afghanistan were directly linked to the operations by the Taliban and Al Queda elements safely ensconced in bases lying within the Pakistan territory. The problem was further complicated by the trust deficit between the Pakistan army, especially the Inter- Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Coalition Forces operating in Afghanistan as well as the Afghan government. The US also wanted the Pakistan army to concentrate on supporting the war effort in Afghanistan., which ,they (Pakistan) argued was possible only after the threat to Pakistan from India eased. Thus the ‘Kashmir dispute’ was injected into the Afghan situation through a somewhat convoluted logic.
In an interview broadcast on MSNBC, Obama indicated that his administration would encourage India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute so that Islamabad can better cooperate with the United States. “we’re going to have to do with respect to Afghanistan is actually deal with Pakistan. And we’ve got to work with the newly elected government there (Pakistan) in a coherent way that says, terrorism is now a threat to you. Extremism is a threat to you. We should — try to resolve the Kashmir crisis so that they (Pakistan) can stay focused not on India, but on the situation with those militants”. .His line to Pakistan was, “look at India and what they are doing, why do you want to keep on being bogged down with this particularly at a time where the biggest threat now is coming from the Afghan border? I think there is a moment where potentially we could get their attention. It won’t be easy, but it’s important”. To Indians, he essentially made “the argument that you guys are on the brink of being an economic superpower, why do you want to keep on messing with this.”
The Obama thesis may sound attractive as part of election rhetoric- quick on impact and easy on the uninitiated minds, but once in oval office, he would find that the issue was much too tangled and highly emotive to admit of any quick fix solution. The internal political dynamics of the two nuclear powers , the baggage of history and rise of Pan-Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan intensely committed to promote terrorism worldwide in general and India with special emphasis on Jammu & Kashmir in particular further aggravated the situation .There was no way the American administration under Obama or any one else could ride rough shod over the perceived interests of the two countries locked in delicate parleys to work out peace and accommodation..
The Obama formulation located the source of Afghan turmoil in Pakistan . It linked the inability of that country to fully discharge her obligations as US partner in the war against the Taliban and Al Queda to its strained relations with India on the ‘dispute over Kashmir’ . In essence it was argued that if the “core issue of Kashmir” were to be settled to the satisfaction on Pakistan, that country would go whole hog to fight the Taliban and Al Queda which would serve the American strategic and security interests packaged as peace in South Asia and the world.
The Obama thesis represents gross over simplification of a complex issue. It is also flawed on facts and ignores ground realities in Pakistan. To begin with, which Pakistan was he talking about? was he talking about the people of Pakistan? If so , he should be aware that according to credible surveys , America is the most hated country in Pakistan . The net result was that even those politicians who would otherwise happily toe the American line were both inhibited and handicapped in openly acting pro-American not with standing the fact that the US military and economic aid that sustained that country And what of Pakistan Taliban whose reach extends from Karakorums to Karachi already locked in grim battle with US coalition forces? . Or does he have the powerful Pak army and its more powerful ISI in mind? That an influential segment of Pakistan military leadership still held the firm view that the Taliban were the ultimate winners was no secret. They, therefore felt that to the “continue working relations with them(Taliban)” and provide them help where possible was in the interest of Pakistan .The cosy relations between the ISI and the Mujahideen (read Talban in the current context) have survived the vicissitudes of time and were as stout as ever. These interestingly date back to the days of Soviet invasion on Afghanistan and Najibullah regime when Pak ISI, the CIA and the Mujahideen (predecessors of the Taliban) collaborated most intimately and at an unprecedented scale. The Americans were fully aware of the ISI-Taliban tie up and therefore do not take them into confidence before launching attacks on Talban/AlQueda hideouts within Pakistan territories. . “They are not sharing any information with us. These are all totally unilateral actions.” Inter-Services Public Relations chief Maj-Gen Athar Abbas complained. Another technique perfected during US-Pak joint operations in Afghanistan was to divert part of the armament and funds to Kashmir with the CIA looking the other way. This experience seems be coming handy now’ “The United States” says Nicholas D. Kristof” has squandered more than $10 million on Pakistan since 9/11, and Pakistan intelligence agencies seem to have rerouted some of that to Talban extremists” The escalating militancy was souring US-Pakistan relations and bringing to fore the conflict of interest between the two partners in the war against international terror. The CIA chief , it may be recalled had sometime back gone to the extent of identifying FATA as the epicentre of Al Queda terror network that targets the USA. Obama’s running mate senator Joe Biden devoted part of his acceptance speech to highlight the fight against extremists in Fata.“ The resurgence of fundamentalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan (is) the real central front against terrorism,” he warned. “The fact is Al Qaeda and the Taliban — the people who actually attacked us on 9/11 — have regrouped in those mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan and are plotting new attacks” ” According to Kristof “If the government wants to stop the Talibanization of Pakistan, the greatest need is not the money but the political will to stop sheltering Taliban leaders in the city of Quetta..” And political will you can not buy or sell. It is rooted in identification of the national interest of a particular country.
President Zardari has repeatedly stated that he apprehends no trouble from India. He had even spoken of” No first use of Nuclear weapon” by his county. How far his word can be trusted and how much clout he actually wielded in the power structure was another matter. In any case , as far as relations with India were concerned India, the Pakistan military establishment’ with its outdated and insecurity oriented mindset called the shots. Was this mindset undergoing any change?. An eminent Pakistan analyst argued that , Gen. Mushaaraf was a “company man ” He made all the moves on Kashmir and the Indo-Pak peace process with the approval of the entire military leadership. This was also borne out by the proceedings in the US Congressional committee. In response to a question from Congressman Ackerman , chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Sub Committee on South Asia, Mitchell Shivers Principal Assistant Secretary for Defence was reported to have stated that “There is no doubt that still within the military rank and file in the army and let us say the leadership they still turn as their greatest threat –the eastern border- the threat from India.” But , he added “We think this is changing and it is changing rapidly.” Obama and his administration will do well to take serious note of this because if true this could provide the space and source for “facilitation” of resolution of Indo-Pak problem.
Washington had so far wisely avoided to ‘prescribe’ a roadmap for resolution of Kashmir imbroglio in view of the fractious and explosive nature of the problem in a volatile and gravely unstable South Asian politico- security environment .In any case the prospects for settling the Kashmir dispute through direct US intervention were rated rather slim. Washington under Obama should therefore tread with extreme circumspection and caution .Given the excellent Indo-US equation based on commonality of interests and high strategic and economic stakes , no one would advise Obama to make the mistake of trying to arm twist India. Here was an issue on which three wars and one mini Kargil war had been fought with Pakistan. The unanimous resolution of Indian parliament calling for vacation of Pakistan’s illegal occupation of the Jammu & Kashmir territory was alive and binding. The emergence of both countries as nuclear powers introduced yet an other worrisome dimension . As for as Pakistan was concerned the shaky state of its polity and economy and strong and widespread Anti-US sentiment prevailing therein set a limit beyond which Pakistan government could not be pushed. No government in that country could afford to be seen as meekly kowtowing American vested interests.
The only conflict-resolution option though somewhat remotely viable was the phased conversion of the existing Line of Control in Jammu & Kashmir into an internationally recognized Indo-Pakistani border. The hiccups and bumps in the Indo-Pak peace parleys not withstanding, the process appeared to be headed in that general direction and was so far holding course. Obama and his administration could and should in the interests of USA itself and peace and stability in South Asia help and gently nudge the parties to move forward towards that goal. This process required to be quickly supplemented by a much needed and overdue change in the Pakistan military doctrine that treats India as enemy number one. The US influence could usefully and effectively work here . If this were to happen and democracy and rule of law firmed up in Pakistan , India, Pakistan and USA might be in a position to collaborate to bring the Afghan situation can under control .Any hasty, rash and ham handed intervention by USA, on the other hand would only further complicate the matters and place the precariously balanced Indo-Pak peace process in serious jeopardy. In the bargain the, forces of peace and amity in South Asia would be weakened and terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir as well in Pakistan revitalized .This revitalization of the three link AlQueda operational structure – the Afghan Taliban, Pakistan Taliban and Lashkar-e-Toiba/ Jaish _e-Mohammad active in J&K.- would create a situation totally in contradiction to that envisaged by the Obama thesis.
The horrendous and unprecedented amphibious assault on Mumbai beginning 26/11 by elements from Pakistan (Laskar-e-Toiba etc) , the ensuing blood bath and waves of terror had created a most sensitive and highly explosive situation. The obvious inability as well as unconcealed unwillingness of a the severely fractured polity in totally destabilised Pakistan had upset equations and severely restricted options post Mumbai terror attack . While this in no way diluted the validity of the above analysis, the Indo-Pak relations were headed for an all time low with all options open for an outraged and terribly angry India. The US needed to address the highly explosive situation top most priority.. Rest can and should wait.
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Mohan.Khajooria
http://www.articlesbase.com/journalism-articles/obamas-kashmir-thesis-670837.html